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A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The
Example of Incest Regulation
Afargaret AI. Afahoney*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A growing number of Americans are members of
stepfamilies. According to the 1990 Census, approximately five
and one-half million married-couple households included at
least one stepchild under age eighteen. 1 This number
constituted twenty-nine percent of the married couple
households with children, and six percent of total households
counted in the census. 2 A total of 7,208,000 stepchildren
resided in these families. 3 Demographers predict that a high
percentage of American children, perhaps one in three, can be
expected to spend some childhood years in a stepfamily. 4
To date, state lawmakers have been slow to recognize the
relationships created between stepparents and their
stepchildren. This result is consistent with the traditional
limitation of family status in American law to married couples
and to parents and their biologic or adopted children. Most of
the important legal issues that affect family members, in such
areas as child support, custody, inheritance, torts, workers'

* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; B.A., LeMoyne
College; J.D., University of Michigan.
1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. P23-180,
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990'S, tbl. L at 10 (October 1992)
[hereinafter CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS].
2 See id. (reporting 19,598,000 married-couple households with biological and
adopted children in 1990); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEp'T OF COMMERCE,
PuB. No. 61, 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: HOUSEHOLDS-STATES: 1980 AND 1990, at 48 (reporting a total of 91,947,000 households in 1990).
3 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, supra note 1, tbl. L at 10.
4 See Paul C. Glick, Remarried Families, Stepfamilies and Stepchildren: A
Brief Demographic Profile, 38 FAM. REL. 24, 26 (1989) (basing projection about
future number of stepchildren on statistics regarding the likelihood of parenthood,
divorce, and remarriage among young married persons); see also Frank F.
Furstenberg, Jr., The New Extended Family: The Experience of Parents and
Children after Remarriage, in REMARRIAOE AND STEPPARENTING 42, 44 (Kay Pasley
& Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman eds., 19R7) (placing estimate at one in four children).
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compensation, and criminal law, are regulated at the state
level. Here, the starting premise is that stepparents and their
stepchildren are legal strangers to each other. Although the
state courts and legislatures have, from time to time,
recognized limited exceptions to this principle, no
comprehensive definition of the stepparent-child status has
been formulated.

II. FORMULATING A LEGAL DEFINITION OF THE STEPFAMILY
The denial of family status to stepparents and stepchildren
has produced a significant gap between legal norms and the
actual family experiences of many people in our society. In
recent years, many scholars have criticized the exclusion of
nontraditional families, including stepfamilies, from the
protection of the law. 5 This type of criticism is the first
important step in evaluating the laws governing relationships
within the stepfamily. The next step involves fashioning a new
stepparent-child status, which would protect stepfamily
members in appropriate cases while preserving a family law
system that is fair, certain, predictable, and not unduly
burdensome on those who must enforce the laws. In defining
the stepparent-child status, two important questions must be
answered. First, what constitutes a legally significant
stepparent-child relationship? Second, what rights and
responsibilities should be associated with stepfamily
membership?

A. Identifying Legally Significant Stepparent-Child
Relationships
The Census Bureau has answered the first of these questions in a very straightforward manner. For the purpose of
counting the number of households with stepchildren, a stepparent-child relationship is formed whenever an individual

5 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive
Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family
Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); Mark A. Fine, A Soctal Science Perspective
on Stepfamily Law: Suggestions for Legal Reform, 38 FAM. REL. 53 (1989); Marie
Witkin Kargman, Stepchild Support Obligations of Stepparents, 32 FAM. REL. 231
(1983); Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and
Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917 (1989); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian·
Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
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marries the custodial parent of a minor child and thereafter
resides with the child. 6 This same approach to identifying stepparent-child relationships is taken in some of the state laws
that confer certain burdens and benefits on stepfamily members. For example, the Missouri stepparent support statute
provides in a straightforward manner that "[a] stepparent shall
support his or her stepchild to the same extent that a natural
or adoptive parent is required to support his or her child so
long as the stepchild is living in the same home as the stepparent."7
Many scholars and lawmakers, however, have concluded
that something more than marriage and a shared residence
should be required before legal consequences attach to the stepparent-child relationship; the additional criteria generally relate to the nature of the relationships actually established over
time in a stepfamily. According to this analysis, legal rights
and duties should exist only if the residential stepparent assumes an active custodial role; for example, by participating in
the child's education, discipline, and moral training, or by making financial contributions to the child's support. Once established in this manner, the stepparent-child status may endure
beyond the child's age of majority.
The courts in this country have developed a legal standard,
called the "in loco parentis" doctrine, which embodies this requirement of active participation by the stepparent. "In loco
parentis," which in Latin means "in the place of a parent,"
applies not only to stepfamilies, but in any situation where an
adult informally assumes custodial responsibility for a child.
The courts have applied the doctrine, however, in a selective
fashion in terms of subject matter. For example, stepparents
who stand in loco parentis to their stepchildren have frequently
been accorded the same treatment as biologic parents in the

6 Notably, the Census Bureau's defmition of stepfamily does not include the
situation where an adult marries the noncustodial parent of minor children; the
new spouse here is not regarded as a stepparent. In a similar fashion, discussions
about stepfamilies in the legal context have, for the most part, been limited in
scope to residential stepparent-child relationships. But see Rosenberg v. Silver, 762
F.2d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing defense of parent-child tort immunity for
the husband of an injured child's noncustodial mother, who did not reside with the
child). Furthermore, the defmitions can become blurred in families where unmarried parents share the joint legal and physical custody of their children. Arguably,
upon the marriage of either parent in this situation, the new spouse would be
regarded as a stepparent under the Census Bureau's defmition of that term.
7 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.400 (Vernon 1986).
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areas of workers' compensation8 and parent-child tort immunity,9 but not in the areas of inheritance 10 and wrongful
death. 11
Like the common law in loco parentis doctrine, a number
of state statutes that confer limited rights upon stepfamilies for
specific purposes apply only if the stepparent and child are
bound together by more than the stepparent's marriage to the
child's parent. For example, the New Jersey inheritance tax
statute establishes preferential rates and exemptions for bequests made to "any child to whom the decedent ... stood in
the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent, provided such
relationship began at or before the child's fifteenth birthday
and was continuous for ten years thereafter.'m Similarly, the
crime of "[s]exual abuse by a parent, guardian or custodian" in
the West Virginia Code applies to "the spouse" of a parent
"where such spouse ... shares actual physical possession or
care and custody of a child with the parent.'' 13 Each of these
statutory standards, like the common law in loco parentis standard, requires the assumption of some form of responsibility by
the stepparent before legal rights and responsibilities are Imposed.

B.

Legal Rights and Responsibilities in the Stepfamily

Once the limitations on legally significant stepparent-child
relationships have been set under the in loco parentis doctrine
or some other standard, the remaining questions involve the
scope of legal rights and responsibilities within the stepfamily.
The logical starting point in this analysis is that qualifying
8 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(6) (Supp. 1992) (establishing eligibility
of child for workers' compensation benefits when the deceased employee stood in
loco parentis to the child for at least one year before the time of injury).
9 See, e.g., Bricault v. Deveau, 157 A.2d 604, 605 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1960)
(stating that the justifications for family immunity are "as applicable to a stepfather who stands in loco parentis to a stepson as they are to the father-son relationship").
10 See, e.g., In re Berge's Estate, 47 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 1951) (ruling
that stepdaughters were not "heirs" of their deceased stepfather, even though he
stood in loco parentis toward them).
11 See, e.g., Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 524 P.2d 801, 803 (Cal. 1974) (holding that stepdaughter was not a beneficiary under the wrongful death statute despite the fact that the decedent stepfather had "assumed the full obligation of
father and parent" before his death). The California legislature overruled this
decision with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West Supp. 1993).
12 N.J. REV. STAT. § 54:34-2.1 (1986).
13 W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8D-1(4) to -1(5) (1992).
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stepfamilies could be treated just like biologic families; that is,
the same legal rights enjoyed by biologic parents and children
could be extended to stepparents and their stepchildren. Indeed, a number of the existing laws dealing with stepfamilies
for specific purposes put them on par with biologic families.
Under the New Jersey inheritance tax statute quoted in the
preceding paragraph, biologic children and qualifying stepchildren enjoy the same preferential tax rates and exemptions, as
the beneficiaries of a deceased parent or stepparent. A second
illustration of equivalent treatment of parent-child and stepparent-child relationships appears in the laws goveming the
discipline of children. In most states, stepparents who stand in
loco parentis to their stepchildren are entitled to discipline
them and are subject to the same limitations on the use of force
as biologic parents. 14
The biologic family is not, however, the only model for
defining legal rights in the stepfamily. For example, state lawmakers have articulated entirely different child support responsibilities for parents and stepparents. 15 In most jurisdictions
today, stepparents have no enforceable obligation whatsoever to
support their stepchildren. But even in the eighteen states
which have imposed statutory stepchild support duties, 16 they
are much less significant than the corollary responsibility of
biologic and adoptive parents. Most notably, the obligation of a
stepparent does not survive the termination of the marriage
which created the stepfamilyY This durational limitation
14 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.61(a)(l) (West 1974) (authorizing
reasonable use of force by parents, stepparents, and others standing in loco parentis).
15 See Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the
Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 43-45 (1984).
16 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 50l(b) (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-4
(1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252A.2(1) (West Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 205.310 (Baldwin 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.400 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-6-217 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-706 (1989) (criminal nonsupport);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.044 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 546-A:1 to
-A:2 (1987); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (McKinney 1983); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 101 (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 15 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.053 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-7-8 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-4.1 to -4.2 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 296 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West Supp. 1993); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 49.195 (West Supp. 1992).
17 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 296 (1989) ("A stepparent has a duty
to support a stepchild if they reside in the same household . . . for so long as the
marital bond creating the step relationship shall continue."). But see N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-09 (1991) (extending stepparent support duty "during the marriage
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stands in stark contrast to the universal rule in the biologic
family, where support obligations continue at least until children reach the age of majority. Professor David L. Chambers
has pointed out that the current law of support in stepfamilies
(no obligation following divorce) and in natural families (full
support responsibility during every child's minority) does not
exhaust the available options; for example, a post-divorce stepparent obligation could be imposed for a shorter period of time
than the duty of biologic parents. 18
In reassessing the scope of legal rights and responsibilities
in the stepfamily, lawmakers need not be limited to the options
of accepting or rejecting rules that apply in the biologic family.
As to each legal issue, lawmakers must determine whether the
family-related policies that justify regulation in the biologic
family also extend to the stepfamily, and if so, what form of
regulation is appropriate in this nontraditional family setting.
Ill.

THE EXAMPLE OF INCEST REGULATION

Many of the general observations made in the preceding
discussion about formulating a sound legal definition of the
stepparent-child relationship can be applied to the specific topic
of incest regulation. In this field, both the threshold issue of
identifying legally significant stepfamily relationships and the
subsequent determination about appropriate forms of regulation are complex and difficult to analyze. The summary of existing state civil and criminal incest statutes, which appears in
the Appendix, reveals a striking lack of consensus about these
matters. The following discussion provides an analytical framework for reconsidering the legal regulation of sexual and marital relationships between steprelatives.

A. Historical Development of the Law
The laws in every state decisively forbid marriage or sexual activity between close biologic relatives, such as siblings or
parents and children. 19 Historically, the canon law of the
Catholic Church, which governed this subject in England before
and so long thereafter as the stepchildren remain in the stepparent's family").
18 David L. Chambers, Stepparents. Biologic Parents, and the Law's Perception of "Family" After Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102, 127-29
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
19 See generally GEORGE THORMAN, lNCESI'UOUS FAMILIES 10-15 (1983) (defming incest in the biologic family).
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the Reformation, treated steprelatives and other persons related by marriage just like blood relatives. 2° For example, marriage between brothers and sisters was forbidden; marriage between stepbrothers and stepsisters was similarly prohibited
because they stood in a close relationship of affinity, created by
the marriage between their parents. 21 The coverage of
steprelatives was continued in subsequent acts of Parliament
and in the early statutes in the United States. 22 As time
passed, however, these restrictions were lifted in many of the
state laws regulating marriage and sexual activity between
relatives.
Currently, the ban on incestuous relationships is enforced
under two types of state regulations. First, the civil laws governing marriage deny all recognition to attempted marriages
between close relatives. And second, a variety of criminal laws
punish attempted marriages, as well as sexual activity outside
of marriage, between family members.
As to steprelatives, the civil marriage laws in just twelve
states currently ban marriages between designated stepfamily
members; the criminal laws in nine states outlaw attempted
marriages; and twenty-nine states include certain stepfamily
members within the definition of special crimes relating to
nonmarital sexual activity within the family. In formulating
and applying these laws, state legislatures and courts have
expressed widely differing viewpoints about the strength of
various public policies that justify incest regulation generally,
and their application in the stepfamily.

B.

The Theoretical Justifications for Regulation

Modern doctrine in this area has been influenced by the
multiple theories propounded by sociologists and legal scholars
to justify incest regulation. 23 Ironically, these various theories
tend to point in divergent directions on the issue of stepfamily
restrictions. This lack of theoretical consistency helps to explain the inconsistency among state laws.

20 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 21-24 (2d ed. 1988).
21 !d. at 23.
22 ld.
23 See generally SYBIL WOLFRAM, IN-LAWS & OUTLAWS: KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 161-85 (1987) (discussing historical development of the various
theories that explain incest regulation).
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For example, one traditional justification for regulation of
family relationships involves the biomedical concern that the
offspring of close relatives will suffer abnormally high rates of
recessive genetic abnormalities. This analysis, which is premised on the common genetic makeup of close biologic relatives, obviously has no application to persons, like
steprelatives, who are not related by blood.:l4 By contrast, a
second explanation draws upon religious history, viewing the
current laws as an extension of earlier ecclesiastical doctrines.25 Under this analysis, the clear religious tenets that
outlawed sexual and marital relationships between
steprelatives in past centuries continue to have modern vitality. Thus, the genetic and religious theories of incest regulation
provide inconsistent answers to the stepfamily question.
Another theory relies upon community norms as the source
and rationale for laws regulating incestuous relationships. 26
For example, most people in American society would predictably disapprove of the marital or sexual relationship established between a parent and his or her adult child; the universal outright ban on such relationships reflects this viewpoint.
The pertinent inquiry relating to relationships of affinity is
whether the same public disapproval would extend to the union
between a stepparent and his or her adult stepchild. The response to that question may well be, "it depends." If the stepparent had assumed a parenting role toward the stepchild,
then the subsequent marriage or sexual relationship between
the two would arguably offend community norms about incestuous behavior. On the other hand, if no real family ties had
ever existed between them, then the subsequent union between
an individual and the adult child of his or her former spouse
would be more likely to escape criticism.
Another important model for understanding the regulation
of marriage and sexual relationships between close relatives

24 See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-3 commentary at 558 (1982) (noting that the
"notion of 'tainting of blood' . . . does not apply to . . . stepchildren and adopted
children," who are nevertheless included in this criminal incest statute); WOLFRAM,
supra note 23, at 138-47 (discussing the relationship between this genetic theory
and the decline of regulation in the stepfamily).
25 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 cmt. 2(a) (1980).
26 See id. at § 230.2 cmt. 2(d) (''Where there is a general and intense hostility to behavior, a penal law will neither be accepted nor respected if it does not
seek to repress that which is universally regarded by the community as misbehavior.").
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emphasizes the welfare of the family members themselves. 27
According to this theory, the incest ban strengthens and stabilizes family relationships by removing the potential for sexual
unions and jealousy within the family household. As with the
application of community norms, concerns about socialization
would most likely be raised in stepfamilies where the members
have functioned as a family unit. In other cases, the concerns
about rivalries, insecurity, or insularity within the family
would be less relevant.
A final justification for the regulation of sexual relationships between close relatives is the protection of weak family
members from sexual overreaching by more powerful relatives,
especially during childhood. 28 According to this rationale, legal
regulation should extend to those stepfamilies where, by virtue
of the roles assumed by the parties, the potential for overreaching exists. Numerous studies of abusive families have established that this protective concern is relevant in the stepfamily
context. 29
Thus, the various theories that explain and justify the
legal prohibition of incestuous relationships emphasize the
welfare of individual family members, the stability of the family unit, and the religious and moral interests of the larger
society. They do not, however, provide a consistent guide for
the proper treatment of stepfamily members.

C.

The Joint Classification of Laws Regulating Sexual
Activity and Marriage

An additional complication arises in the analysis of this
topic because laws regulating several distinct types of behavior
have generally been classified together as incest regulations.
Thus, the laws in this field determine the legitimacy of the
marriage contracted between a surviving spouse (stepparent)
and the adult child (stepchild) of his or her deceased partner.
At the same time, this system of rules must address the crimi-

27 See JOSEPH SHEPHER, INCEST: A BIOSOCIAL VIEW 135-50 (1983) (discussing
the theories of Sigmund Freud and the family socialization school as they relate to
incest regulation).
28 See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 cmt. 2(e) (1980) ("(Incest] laws have
operated primarily against a kind of imposition on young and dependent females.").
29 See, e.g., W.D. Erickson et al., The Life Histories and Psychological Profiles of 59 Incestuous Stepfathers, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 349 (1987);
Patricia Phelan, The Process of Incest: Biologic Father and Stepfather Families, 10
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 531 (1986).

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

30

[Volume 8

nal responsibility of a stepparent who engages in sexual activity with the minor stepchild with whom he or she resides. Both
the marriage regulation and the criminal law, which direct the
outcomes in these two situations, are classified generally as
incest regulations. In the biologic family, both the attempted
marriage and the sexual relationship between a parent and his
or her child would easily be characterized as incestuous and
unlawful under relevant state laws. A single line of analysis
may not, however, produce a satisfactory outcome in the two
hypothetical situations involving stepfamily members.
The Model Penal Code illustrates this problem. A single
provision of the Code criminalizes marriage, cohabitation and
sexual intercourse between designated family members. 30 The
drafters expressly excluded steprelatives from this provision
with the following explanation: "Because there are situations
where persons related by affinity should be permitted to marry,
it therefore follows that they should not be included within the
incest prohibition."31 Thus, the Code's monolithic approach to
the topic of stepfamily relationships, emphasizing the subject of
marriage eligibility, foreclosed any separate consideration of
the policy concerns raised by sexual activity between stepfamily
members outside of marriage.
A more refined approach, which separately addresses the
issues of marriage regulation and criminal nonmarital sexual
activity, has been taken in a number of recent state statutes.
This approach enables lawmakers to consider relevant policies
relating to religion, morality, the family institution, and the
protection of children separately in the two discreet settings.
Not surprisingly, among the states that have used this bifurcated model, stepfamilies have found their way most often into
the laws regulating sexual activity outside of marriage.

D.

Criminal Statutes that Include the Age Factor

An additional refinement, relating to the victim's age, appears in many modern criminal statutes. The traditional incest
laws, like the Model Penal Code provision described in the last
section, prohibit marriage and/or sexual activity without regard
to the age of the parties. By contrast, statutes enacted in about
one-third of the states combine the age of the victim with the

30 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (1980).
31 !d. at § 230.2 cmt. 3(b).

21]

DEFINING THE STEPFAMILY

31

parties' family relationship as elements of the criminal offense.
Although the purposes of these statutes tend to overlap with
the purposes of the "statutory rape" laws, which prohibit sexual
activity with underage partners, they also protect special family-related interests. 32 Stepparent-child relationships are included in almost all of the laws that combine age and family
relationship.
The factors employed in these state statutes are designed
to identify situations where a power imbalance exists in the
family, similar to the authority exercised by parents over their
children. For example, the North Carolina "sexual offenses with
certain victims" felony statute proscribes sexual activity on the
part of "a defendant who has assumed the position of a parent
in the home of a minor victim."33 Similarly, West Virginia
defines the term "custodian" in the "[s]exual abuse by a parent,
guardian or custodian" statute to include "the spouse of a parent . . . where such spouse . . . shares actual physical possession or care and custody of a [minor] child with the parent."34
Both statutes would apply to stepfamilies when the stepparent
plays an active parenting role with respect to minor stepchildren.

E.

Traditional Incest Laws that Exclude the Age Factor

Stepfamily members are included less often in the traditional incest laws, which regulate marriage and/or sexual activity between close relatives without regard to age. Currently,
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia retain civil restrictions on marriage between certain biologic relatives; fortyfour states have laws criminalizing marriage and/or sexual
conduct without regard to age. 35 Steprelatives are included in
fewer than one-half of these civil and criminal statutes. For
example, the Wyoming felony incest statute provides:
[A] person is guilty of incest if he knowingly commits sexual

32 A study that summarizes all of the criminal laws involving sexual activity
with minor victims, in which the element of family relationship is one of several
variables noted, appears in JOSEPHINE BULKLEY & LUCY BERLINER, CmLD SEXUAL
ABUSE AND THE LAW: A REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NATIONAL
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION (2d ed. 1982).
33 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (1986).
34 W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8D-1, -5 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
35 A compilation of theses statutes and related information appears in the
Appendix.
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intrusion ... or sexual contact ... with an ancestor or descendant or a brother or sister of the whole or half blood. The
relationships referred to herein include relationships of ...
[s]tepparent and stepchild. 36

As to adult biologic relatives, this statute may still reflect
all of the historical goals of incest regulation relating to genetics, religion, morality, community norms, and the family institution. The additional questions raised by extending this traditional type of regulation to adults related by marriage were
highlighted in the recent case of State v. Buck. 37 There, an
appellate court in Oregon upheld the conviction of a stepfather
for incest, based on his sexual relationship with an adult stepdaughter, after rejecting the defendant's request to read an age
limitation into the criminal incest statute. The ruling reflects
the view that meaningful state policies continue to justify this
limitation on the freedom of adults to select sexual partners
outside the biologic family.
Numerous policy interests are implicated for stepfamilies
in the broader type of regulation applied in Buck. First, the
vulnerability of stepchildren in the family may continue beyond
their age of majority, thereby justifying the ban on adult relationships. Second, stability and harmony in the stepfamily may
be enhanced by the restriction on sexual relationships between
consenting adults. Third, the broad application of criminal
prohibitions on sexual activity without regard to age may, in
fact, vindicate the views of the community, past and present,
regarding moral behavior in the stepfamily. A contrary view
about the proper weight to be assigned to these considerations
is reflected in the laws in the majority of states, where sexual
activity between adult stepfamily members is not regulated.

F.

Stepfamilies and the Freedom to Marry

Additional considerations enter into the analysis when the
state seeks to restrict the freedom to select a marriage partner.
First, personal freedom in this area is entitled to protection in
the absence of compelling reasons to limit individual choice. 38
36 WYO. STAT. § 6-4-402 (1988).
37 State v. Buck, 757 P.2d 861 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
38 See Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free to Many?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257 (1984); Leonard P. Strickman,
Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 15 FAM. L.Q. 259, 279-97 (1982); Note, The
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1159, 1248-70 (1980).
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Furthermore, the enforcement of marriage restrictions frequently results in serious hardship for the parties of de facto
unions. Of course, compelling justifications have nevertheless
been found for the universal ban on marriages between close
biologic relatives. By way of contrast, the laws in only nineteen
states currently extend the civil and/or criminal ban on marriage between close relatives to stepfamily members.
The decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Rhodes v.
McAfee 39 provides a focal point for analyzing the laws that
prohibit marriage between steprelatives. In Rhodes, the court
invalidated the fourteen year union between B.E. Plunk and
Gladys Griggs under a state statute banning stepparent-child
marriages. The stepfather, B.E. Plunk, first married Gladys'
mother, Tula Griggs; thereafter, Gladys resided for a number of
years in the household created by her mother and stepfather.
Five children were born during the marriage of B.E. Plunk and
Tula Griggs, which ended in divorce in 1943. Regrettably, the
Rhodes opinion does not indicate the parties' ages nor the duration of this first marriage. In 1944, B.E. Plunk married his
stepdaughter Gladys Griggs, and the couple subsequently had
three children. The Rhodes case involved Gladys Griggs' claim
to the economic rights of a surviving wife, particularly homestead and dower rights in B.E. Plunk's property, following his
death in 1958.
The opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court emphasized
the public policies involved in the regulation of marriage between close relatives, including the moral standards of the
community and the harmony and stability of the family. According to the court, these policies were embodied in the Tennessee statutes that prohibited marriage between stepparents
and stepchildren and were properly applied to the relationship
between Gladys Griggs and B.E. Plunk:
[TJhe statutes here at issue ... are expressive of settled public policy in this State regarding public morals and good order
in society .... This case is a good example of why such marriages are prohibited. The stepdaughter lived in the home
with the mother and stepfather ... [and her] status in this
family would be closely akin to the natural children of a
mother and stepfather .... If there were no statutes prohibiting such marriages, there not only could but very likely would

39 Rhodes v. McAfee, 457 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1970).
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[be] discord and disharmony in the family. 40

From the court's viewpoint, the family first created by the marriage of B.E. Plunk and Gladys Griggs' mother, Tula Griggs,
was analogous to the biologic family for these purposes.
The Rhodes opinion failed to address a countervailing consideration, namely, the serious hardship imposed upon Gladys
Griggs and her children under Tennessee law. Of course, this is
the inevitable burden imposed by any rule of law that invalidates de facto marriage unions. The law of Tennessee still
reflects the view that this type of burden is justified in the
stepparent-child setting by the public policy concerns identified
in the Rhodes opinion. 41 In contrast, the legislatures in most
states have assigned greater weight to the interests of individuals like Gladys Griggs and eliminated all civil and criminal
restrictions on marriages between stepparents and stepchildren
after the prior marriage of the stepparent to the child's parent
has come to an end.
In 1986, Parliament amended the English Marriage Act in
an effort to balance the competing policies involved in this situation. The Marriage Act, which previously banned all marriages between stepparents and stepchildren and certain other persons related by affinity, now provides that the marriage between stepparent and stepchild, or between stepgrandparent
and stepgrandchild,
". . . shall not be void by reason only of that relationship if
both the parties have attained the age of twenty one at the
time of the marriage and the younger party has not at any
time before attaining the age of eighteen been a child of the
family in relation to the other party." 42

The Marriage Act defines "child of the family" to mean "a child
who has lived in the same household as [the steprelative] and
been treated by that person as a child of his family."43
The result for Gladys Griggs under this provision would
likely be the same as under the Tennessee statute applied in
the Rhodes case. Because she resided as a child in the home of
her mother and stepfather, the subsequent marriage between
40 ld. at 524.
41 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-101 (1991).
42 Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986, § 1, reprinted in
27 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 562 (4th ed. 1987).
43 Id.
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Gladys Griggs and her stepfather would remain unlawful under
the reformed English law. Still, the Marriage Act is a thoughtful attempt to limit the prohibition on marriage between stepparents and stepchildren in order to avoid undue interference
with their individual rights. No similar reform of the marriage
laws has occurred in the United States.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the current laws regulating sexual activity
and marriage between stepfamily members reveal a wide variety in the legislative treatment of these issues. A comparative
analysis of the various statutory approaches to stepfamily regulation raises several questions. First, do family-related policies
exist in this context that justify legal limitations on the behavior of stepfamily members? If so, what restrictions are appropriate? And finally, how should the stepparent-child relationship be defined for the purpose of regulating sexual activity
and marriage between the parties?
Several insights, derived from the analysis of existing laws,
are helpful in answering these questions. First, the needs of
children deserve special consideration in the formulation of
laws regulating sexual behavior within the stepfamily. Second,
the separate treatment of marriage regulations and the restrictions on nonmarital sexual conduct makes sense in the context
of stepfamilies. Finally, the definition of the legal stepparentchild status can be limited for these purposes to cases where
family ties have been established between the parties. The
recent reform of the English marriage law embodies this approach, as do the state criminal laws that require an in loco
parentis relationship between defendants and their minor victims.
Mter accounting for the age factor, the distinction between
marriage and sexual activity outside of marriage, and the importance of de facto family ties in the stepfamily, the evaluation of stepfamily regulations still requires a careful balancing
of competing policy considerations. The interests of individuals
in freely selecting sexual and marriage partners must be balanced against the interests of the state in protecting the family
institution and the mores of the community. A reasonable
scheme of regulation, like that embodied in the English Marriage Act, might permit marriage and sexual activity outside of
marriage between stepparent and stepchild in situations where
family-related policies are likely to be weakest. For example,
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personal freedom may be protected in cases where no de facto
ties were established between the parties while the child was a
minor or resided as a family member in the stepparent's household. On the other hand; upon revisiting these issues, lawmakers might decide to strike the balance in favor of greater, or
lesser, protection of personal freedom for stepfamily members.
A comprehensive legal definition of the stepfamily is an important goal for the family law system of the Twenty-first Century.
Reassessment of family-related policies, as they apply to nontraditional families in the field of incest regulation and in
many other areas of the law, is an important step toward
achieving this goal.
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